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Abstract
Emission reduction from the coal-dominated power sector is vital for achieving China’s carbon
mitigation targets. Although the coal expansion has been slowed downdue to the cancellation of and
delay in new construction, coal-based powerwas responsible for over one third of China’s energy-
relatedCO2 emissions by 2018.Moreover, with a technical lifetime of over 30 years, current
investment in coal-based power could hinder CO2mitigation until 2050. Therefore, it is important to
examinewhether the current coal-based power planning aligns with the long-term climate targets.
This paper introduces China’sNationallyDeterminedContribution (NDC) goals and an ambitious
carbon budget alongwith global pathways well-below 2 degrees that are divided intoﬁve integrated
assessmentmodels, which are two national and three globalmodels.We compare themodels’ results
with bottom-up data on current capacity additions and expansion plans to examine if theNDC targets
are in linewith 2-degree pathways. The keyﬁndings are: 1. NDC goals alone are unlikely to lead to
signiﬁcant reductions in coal-based power generation. On the contrary,more plantsmay be built
before 2030; 2. this would require an average of 187–261TWhof annual coal-based power capacity
reduction between 2030 and 2050 to achieve a 2 °C compatible trajectory, whichwould lead to the
stranding of large-scale coal-based power plants; 3. if the reduction in coal power can be brought
forward to 2020, the average annual coal-based power reduction requiredwould be 104–155TWh
from2020 to 2050 and the emissions could peak earlier; 4. early regulations in coal-based powerwould
require accelerated promotion of alternatives between 2020 and 2030, with nuclear, wind and solar
power expected to be themost promising alternatives. By presenting the stranding risk and viability of
alternatives, we suggest that both the government and enterprises should remain cautious about
making new investment in coal-based power sector.
1. Introduction
China, as part of its commitment to the Paris Agree-
ment, has submitted a Nationally Determined
Contribution (NDC) that pledges an emissions peak
around 2030, among other things. Emission reduction
from the primarily coal-dominated power sector is a
critical task for China to achieve to meet such climate
mitigation targets. Coal is the biggest power source in
China, accounting for 37% of its energy-related
emission in 2018 (Wang 2018, China Electricity
Council 2019, National Bureau of Statistics 2019,
National Energy Administration 2019).
The Chinese government has implemented several
measures to slow down the expansion of coal power
plants (Ren et al 2019), whereas the installed capacity
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of coal-based power plants is still growing. The annual
capacity addition started to decrease in 2015, and in
2017 and 2018, this addition has been the lowest since
2005 (Endcoal 2019, Shearer et al 2019). Most coal-
based power units have a technical lifetime of over 30
years; therefore, a lock-in effect could occur with a
large-scale investment in coal-based power plants. The
newly-built plants may get stranded in the future, as
they could be incompatible with the well-below
2-degree (WB2C) target, which requires global elec-
tricity decarbonization by 2050.
To understand coal lock-in from a global perspec-
tive, Tong et al estimated CO2 emissions from existing
and proposed fossil fuel infrastructure. They stated
that this infrastructure will not help achieve the 1.5 °C
target. Moreover, they pointed out the importance of
the power sector in decarbonizing the energy system
(Tong et al 2019). Cui et al compared the existing and
planned coal-based power plant development with cli-
mate targets to demonstrate that the operational life-
time of existing coal plants should be reduced to 35
and 20 years to meet the 2 °C and 1.5 °C targets,
respectively (Cui et al 2019). With a focus on the US,
Lyer et al also found that coal power plants may face
the risk of being prematurely retired by modeling the
low-emission development strategy with the GCAM
model (Iyer et al 2017). Some other studies that have
focused on global climate change have also mentioned
that China could face stranded risks in coal power.
However, detailed analysis on the Chinese power sys-
tem is limited, given their global perspective (Farfan
andBreyer 2017, Edenhofer et al 2018).
Several studies have highlighted the stranded risks
for China’s coal-based power plants, based on the cur-
rent status of electricity supply and demand (Mylly-
virta et al 2015, Slater 2016, Yuan et al 2016, Yuan et al
2018). Only a few China-centric studies have con-
sidered CO2 mitigation goals when evaluating the
future of coal-based power, with most of them sug-
gesting to control the scale of coal-based power imme-
diately. Spencer et al estimated the stranded value of
coal-based power in China under NDC and 2-degree
scenarios and suggested to halt new investment in coal
power and to use the existing plants as backup capacity
(Spencer et al 2017). Wand et al analyzed the low-car-
bon transitions of China’s power system with the
China TIMES model, and concluded that investing in
coal-based power plants could become uneconomic
once a stringent climate target is introduced into the
system (Wang et al 2019). Fan et al explored the carbon
capture and storage (CCS) retroﬁt potential of coal-
ﬁred power plants in China and concluded that CCS
should realize commercialization before 2040 to make
CCS retroﬁt a cost-effective solution (Fan et al 2018).
These studies provided valuable insight by pre-
senting the coal lock-in issue and by proposing
approaches for coal-based power reduction. However,
further research is needed to understand the transition
in the power system. First, model projections alone are
not enough to evaluate the lock-in risks of coal power.
The bottom-up data, which show the former and cur-
rent investment in coal power, are also necessary. Sec-
ond, the coal-based power reduction not only affects
the existing coal-based power plants, but has an
impact on the continuous electricity supply. Conse-
quently, it is of great importance to see how the power
system could react to the coal phase-out.
This paper combines bottom-up data on current
capacity additions and expansion plans for power
technologies and scenario results from integrated
assessment models (IAMs), in order to analyze the
lock-in effect of China’s coal power industry. Based on
themultiple models’ results, we also explore the devel-
opment potential of alternative power generation
technologies, which can be used to close the electricity
supply gap caused by the coal power reduction.
2.Methodology
As shown in table 1, this research involves ﬁve IAMs
that demonstrate a harmonized scenario analysis for
theChinese energy system. The technology options for
eachmodel can be seen in SI.1.
By introducing national policies and climate tar-
gets into models, this paper designed three scenarios:
reference scenario ‘NPi,’ ‘2C_early’ and ‘2C_delayed’.
The ‘NPi’, which stands for National Policies
Implemented scenario, represents the most important
current energy and climate policies identiﬁed within
the CD-LINKS project (NewClimate 2018). In the
other two scenarios, that is 2C_early and 2C_delayed,
a WB2C target is introduced in the models as a con-
straint on cumulative CO2 emissions (carbon budget).
In global models, the budget is 1000 Gt CO2 for global
energy and land-use systems between 2010 and 2100.
From global models’ results, the national budget for
China between 2010 and 2050 ranges from 210–335
Gt. Thus, the prescribed budget for national models
was chosen to be 290 Gt (for emissions trajectories, see
ﬁgure SI.9, which is available online at stacks.iop.org/
ERL/15/024007/mmedia in the Supplementary
Information).
The ‘2C_early’ scenario follows the NPi trajectory
until 2020, and WB2C targeted mitigation begins
thereafter.
The ‘2C_delayed’ scenario follows the current
NDC trajectory until 2030, and the WB2C targeted
mitigation begins thereafter, without prior anticipa-
tion. For theNDC trajectory until 2030, we considered
four goals of the Chinese NDC explicitly: a 60%–65%
reduction of carbon intensity of GDP in 2030, com-
pared with 2005; at least 20% of non-fossil fuels in pri-
mary energy in 2030; CO2 emission peak in 2030 or
earlier.
To estimate the scale of coal power plants with
stranded risk, we combined the coal power generation
projection from IAMs and the existing coal capacity
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Table 1. List ofmodels used in this paper. ‘Elastic demand’ speciﬁes whether energy (service) demand is price-elastic in the respectivemodel, ‘capacity calibration’ speciﬁes whether the calibration includes installed capacity and load factors
(or only generation numbers), and ‘early retirement’ speciﬁeswhether complete early retirement of plants is an available option (thoughmodels without this option still can reduce load factors to some extent).
Model period Elastic demand Capacity calibration Early retirement
Globalmodels MESSAGE-GLOBOIM (Messner and Strubegger 1995) 2005–2100 Yes No Yes
POLESCDL (Després et al 2018) 2005–2100 Yes Yes No
REMIND-MAgPIE (Luderer et al 2015) 2005–2100 Yes No Yes
Nationalmodels China TIMES (Chen et al 2015) 2010–2050 Yes Yes No
IPAC-AIM/technology (Jiang et al 1998) 2005–2050 No Yes No
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from statistical data. As differentmodels have different
inputs on the operating hours and technical lifetime,
wemade twomajor assumptions to improve the com-
parability: the full load hour (FLH) is assumed to be
4400 h, which was roughly the average level in 2015
(Yan and Yuan 2016); the technical lifetime is assumed
to be 40 years, according to a former IAMs study (Krey
et al 2019). Themain idea is to calculate the demand of
operating plants from IAM coal power generation
projection, to calculate the actual capacity from the
statistics and the assumed lifetime. Then, we use
‘stranded capacity’ to describe the gap between the
demand and actual value of coal power capacity in this
study. Therefore, in this study, the stranded capacity
does not refer to those plants being completely stran-
ded in the future. It is more the plants with risk of
being completely or partially stranded. The detailed
calculation method is introduced in SI.2, and the sen-
sitive analysis on FLH and technical lifetime is shown
in SI.3.
3. Results
3.1. Coal power generation inChina underNDC
goals andWB2C target
The current Chinese NDC is unlikely to lead to a
signiﬁcant reduction in coal power in the near future.
Instead, there may be more investment in coal-based
power plant generation capacity before 2030. From
the models’ results, coal power generation is expected
to be 3820–5280 TWh in 2030, with three out of the
ﬁve models showing an increase of 7%–22% from
2020 to 2030 (see ﬁgure 1). This increase implies that
investing in coal power is still a cost-effective choice so
far inmostmodels.
If WB2C is to be met after achieving NDC goals in
2030, drastic reduction in coal-based power genera-
tion is necessary to break out of the coal lock-in. In the
2C_delayed scenario, mostmodels suggested the elim-
ination of coal-based power by mid-century, which
requires a rapid coal phase-out from 2030. From 2030
to 2050, the models’ results indicate that 187–261
TWh of coal power reduction should be realized every
single year, which equals 3%–4%of the total electricity
demand in 2018 (China Electricity Council 2019).
The ﬁrst few years of the phase-out process can be
especially challenging. During the ﬁrst ﬁve years of
WB2C mitigation (2030–2035), coal-based power
generation should decrease by over 35% in all models.
For the China TIMES and POLES models, this
decreasemay even reach 50%, as they will have a larger
coal-based power expansion before 2030 than the
othermodels.
If the WB2C mitigation could start from 2020 (as
indicated in the 2C_early scenario), models would
stop investing in coal power immediately. Early action
could help to avoid the additional coal lock-in, leading
to a smoother coal elimination process. From 2020 to
2050, the average annual reduction in coal-based
power, which is obtained from themodels, is expected
to be 104–155 TWh per year. Although this change is
still huge for the power system, this improvement
from the 2C_delayed scenario is signiﬁcant.
The 2C_early scenario requires that the coal power
reduction start from 2020. In doing so, coal-based
Figure 1. Left panel shows the coal-based power generation obtained from themodels. Right panel compares the capacity data from
different sources: the ‘2018 operating,’ ‘2018 operating+under construction,’ ‘2018 operating+under construction+planned’
data comes fromEndcoal (Endcoal 2019, Shearer et al 2019), the ‘2020 goal in the 13th FYP’ data comes from the 13th Five-year
Planning of China (NationalDevelopment andReformCommission 2016), the ‘2030WEO-SDS’ comes from the sustainable scenario
inWorld EnergyOutlook 2018 (IEA 2018), the ‘2030 2C_delayed’ and ‘2030 2C_early’ data comes from themodels in this research.
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power generation would be 18%–73% lower than the
2C_delayed scenario by 2030. Early effort in control-
ling coal-based power could also help the energy-rela-
ted CO2 emission to peak earlier. In the 2C_early
scenario, CO2 emissions are able to peak before 2025
in all models with a 5%–15% lower peak value than
those in theNDC scenario.
Two problems might arise due to the rapid coal
phase-out in power systems: the existing coal-based
power plants will face stranded risk, which could cause
economic losses for investors; the sudden drop in
power generation from coal could cause a supply
shortage and alternative power generation plants will
be needed tomeet the electricity demand.
3.2. Stranded risk of investment in coal-based power
With a long technical lifetime, newly-built coal-based
power plants are expected to be operational until mid-
century, leading to a signiﬁcant carbon lock-in risk.
Krey et al found that the technical lifetime of coal-
based power plants ranges from 30–60 years in IAMs
(Krey et al 2019).
According to Endcoal data (Endcoal 2019, Shearer
et al 2019), the operating units in 2018 were expected
to emit 129 Gt CO2 in their remaining lifetime.
Another 32 Gt CO2 of emission will be generated if all
the units that are under construction and are being
planned eventually get built. By the time they ﬁnish
their lifetime, they would leave very tight emission
space for other energy sectors.
3.2.1. Additional generation cost from the carbon price
To achieve the mitigation goals, a carbon price is
applied to the models (see SI.4), which gradually
increases as the emission space gets tighter. As the
carbon price increases, coal-based power plants may
lose their cost advantage over other technologies.
In the 2C_delayed scenario, carbon prices increase
drastically after 2030. Before that, to achieve the NDC
goals, models in this research suggest a carbon price of
0–30.5 $/t CO2. This price level should be achievable
given the current status, which is the average carbon
price that once reached 8.8 $/t CO2 during the pilot
stage (Shuang and Zheng 2017). However, this price
might not be enough to force coal power out of the sys-
tem. In 2035, the carbon price would reach 24–194 $/t
CO2 with a median value of 105 $/t CO2. With a car-
bon price of 105 $/t CO2, coal power generation will
have an additional cost of around 0.103 $/kWh (given
coal power’s CO2 intensity is roughly 1 t CO2/MWh).
In this case, most coal plants would lose their
competitiveness.
The carbon price increase will be gradual in the
2C_early scenario; however, the increase is immediate
once the WB2C target is introduced into model runs.
This price change indicates the total cost of the energy
systemwill need to be increased once the early action is
taken in 2020. In 2025, the carbon price would be 0–54
$/t CO2 with a median value of 23 $/t CO2. With a
carbon price of 23 $/t CO2, the generation cost of
coal-based power will increase by 0.023 $/kWh. As a
result, no more investment would go into coal power
plants after that, while the electricity generation from
existing plantsmay still be economical.
To achieve the WB2C target, the required carbon
price in the 2C_delayed scenario may even reach over
500 $/t CO2 bymid-century. In 2050, the carbon price
is expected to reach 48–693 $/t CO2, with a median
value of 219 $/t CO2. In the 2C_early scenario, it could
be reduced to 42–433 $/t CO2, with a median value of
181 $/t CO2.
3.2.2. Estimated scale of assets with stranded risk
In recent years, an overcapacity issue has begun in
China’s coal power industry, which is reﬂected in the
decline of average operating hours. Since 2014,
China’s economy has entered the NewNormal (Green
and Stern 2015), which implies a slower GDP growth
and a less resource-intensive development pattern in
the coming decades. Therefore, the growth in electri-
city demand will also slow down. On the other hand,
with the rapid growth of power capacity and the
government’s promotion of renewable power genera-
tion, the power generation demand for coal-based
power plants is not as big as it was previously.
With the rising carbon price in the WB2C scenar-
ios, a great number of existing plants as well as newly-
built plants may face stranded risk in the medium to
long term.
A signiﬁcant amount of the existing coal-based
power plants may be still within their technical life-
time by mid-century. Based on the survey from End-
coal (Endcoal 2019, Shearer et al 2019), as of February
2019, the operating coal-based power units in China
are around 940 GW and the average age of these units
is roughly 11.5 years. In this research, we choose 40-
year as a reference lifetime to estimate the stranded
assets scale. Using this reference, 450 GW from plants
already in existence in 2018 will still be operational in
2050 (see ﬁgure 2(e)).
With current NDC goals, 70–400 GW of new coal
units are to be built during 2020 and 2030, and these
capacities are more likely to face stranded risk in the
later stage as coal-based power generation is expected
to be zero by 2050, if a 2 °C compatible budget is to be
used. In the 2C_delayed scenario, the stranded risks of
coal powerwill drastically increase after 2030. By 2050,
500–850 GW of coal power units may face the risk of
being stranded.
Early mitigation could help to reduce the stranded
risk by stopping new investment to avoid additional
coal lock-in. In the 2C_early scenario, most models
stop building new coal power plants by 2020. This
action can reduce the units with stranded risk by at
least 150 GW, compared with the 2C_delayed sce-
nario. Since coal-based power phase-out starts earlier
in this scenario, the stranded risks may also occur
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earlier. Moreover, additional cost may occur with the
early phase-out action: economic and political cost
from stopping the ongoing coal-based power plants,
new investment demand from building more clean
power capacities to ensure electricity supply. How-
ever, from a long-term perspective, the 2C_early sce-
nario will show its signiﬁcant effect on reducing the
stranded coal power plants after 2030.
Note that as the estimation of stranded scale is
quite sensitive to the FLH and technical lifetime (Cui
et al 2019), we also included a sensitive analysis (see
SI.3). The ﬁrst analysis shows the results under 4000
and 3500 h of FLH, and the second analysis shows the
results under 30 and 35 years of lifetime assumption.
3.3. Possible alternatives under cost-optimal
scenarios
In addition to the stranded risk of coal-based power
plants, reduction in coal-based power generation will
also bring new challenges to the promotion of other
power sources.
In both 2C scenarios, the electricity demand will
have continuous growth until mid-century (see SI.5),
as the electriﬁcation process is critical in decarboniz-
ing end-use sector energy consumption. In 2030, the
electricity demand would increase by 41%–89% and
47%–106% in the 2C_early and 2C_delayed scenarios,
respectively, compared with the 2015 level. This
translates into yearly demand increases of
120–300 TWh yr−1.
The 2C_early scenario could help to reduce the
stranded risks, while this scenario requires an acceler-
ated promotion of renewables, from 2020 onwards. As
the coal power reduction begins 10 years earlier in this
scenario than in the 2C_delayed scenario, more alter-
natives should be deployed to ﬁll the electricity supply
gap from then. In 2030, for most models, the low-car-
bon power generation in the 2C_early scenario is
required to be 14%—56% higher than in the
2C_delayed scenario, as shown inﬁgure 3.
Nuclear, wind and solar power are expected to
make the biggest contribution to ﬁlling the electricity
supply gap. As shown in ﬁgure 3, nuclear power gen-
eration would increase by 600–1320 TWh from 2017
to 2030 in the 2C_early scenario and account for the
biggest share in the ‘excess’ generation by 2030 in the
two models, namely POLES and China TIMES.
Besides nuclear energy, intermittent renewables
including wind and solar power are also projected to
expand considerably by most models. Their genera-
tion growth from 2017 to 2030 would be 640–1580
TWh and 210–2020 TWh, respectively. Furthermore,
other alternatives are expected to experience gradual
development before 2030. Hydropower accounts for
over 15% of all the gross electricity at present (China
Electricity Council 2019). The expansion of
Figure 2.Upper panel shows the estimated scale of stranded coal power plants in the 2C_early scenario (a) and 2C_delayed scenario
(b). Lower panel further compares the stranded scalewith capacity existing in 2018with 2030 (c), 2040 (d) and 2050 (e). In the lower
panel, the gray bar shows the plants that existed in 2018while still within their lifetime in the given period; the orange bar and blue bar
show the range of stranded plants in the 2C_early and 2C_delayed scenarios, respectively, with the line highlighting themedian value.
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hydropower in the future could be limited, as most of
the resources with easy access have already been devel-
oped (Peng 2019). As for CCS-equipped generation
technologies, they may not be able to play a signiﬁcant
role in the power system at present or in a near future
because of their high generation cost (Liu and
Tian 2017).
To further explore the possible transition strategy
for China’s power system, we provide more informa-
tion on themajor alternatives by combining themodel
projections with data on capacity additions in recent
years and the near-term outlook of technologies.
3.3.1.Wide uncertainty about nuclear power
Although most models agree that nuclear power is an
essential alternative during the coal phase-out process,
there is wide uncertainty in the pre-2030 projection. In
the 2C_early scenario, the capacity of nuclear power
ranges from 120–210 GW in 2030. Given that the
national plan for 2020 is 58 GW of nuclear power
(National Development and Reform Commis-
sion 2016), the results from the models imply that the
installed capacity should be doublewithin ten years.
On comparing the models’ results with historical
trend, it was found that deployment goals from most
models were rather ambitious. In 2018, the installed
capacity for nuclear power in China was 45 GW
(China Electricity Council 2019) and the units under
construction and those planned were around 13 and
51 GW, respectively (World Nuclear Associa-
tion 2019). To achieve themodels’ 2030 goals, projects
currently under construction and those planned
should be accomplished by then. Moreover, an
additional 10–100 GWof new projects should be plan-
ned and accomplished. Compared to the historical
data (the average annual addition in China was 4 GW
in 2011–2018), themodels’ goals seem to be ambitious
(see ﬁgure 4).
From a long-term perspective, great uncertainty in
nuclear development still exists. By mid-century,
nuclear power is expected to provide 15%–30% of the
gross electricity in both 2C scenarios, with installed
capacities ranging from 230–670 GW, compared to
approximately 400 GW operational globally in 2019
(World Nuclear Association 2019). This uncertainty is
also presented in many existing publications, includ-
ing IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2015) and
GlobalWarming of 1.5-degree report (IPCC 2018).
If nuclear power is going to compensate for coal-
based power reduction, inland plant projects would be
necessary. To date, all the nuclear power plants in
China are coastal plants, and it is still controversial in
China to build inland plants (Wu 2017). However, a
large share of the existing coal power plants is built to
provide electricity in inland areas, which indicates that
some of the new nuclear plants should be built in
inland areas. In this case, two problems need to be
solved: public acceptance and coolingwater demand.
3.3.2. Shared underestimation of solar power
Wind and solar are both promising power sources for
China, and they are expected to be themost important
alternatives. In the 2C_early scenario, the installed
capacity of wind and solar will reach 560–680 GW and
180–1400 GW, respectively, by 2030. Wind power is
expected to have higher generation than solar power in
Figure 3.This ﬁgure shows the low-carbon power generation in 2017, and in 2030 for the ﬁvemodels in both 2 °C scenarios.
Furthermore, the ‘excess’ bar indicates the gap between the 2C_delayed scenario and 2C_early scenario.
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most models (except for the REMIND model), which
seems to be an underestimation of solar power
(Creutzig et al 2017).
Solar power is experiencing rapid development in
China. The annual capacity addition of solar power
has exceeded the addition of wind power since 2016.
In 2017 and 2018, a total of 54 and 44 GW of solar
power capacity was installed in China. Meanwhile, the
addition to wind power was 17 GW in 2018 (China
Electricity Council 2019), see SI.7. In the 13th Five-
year Power Development Planning (National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission 2016), the solar
power target has been set at 110 GW in 2020, and this
target has already been achieved in advance, with Chi-
na’s capacity at the end of 2018 being 174 GW.
Most models have difﬁculty keeping up with the
enormous dynamism experienced in the PV industry
in recent years, both with respect to market growth
and cost reduction (Creutzig et al 2017). In both the
2C_early and 2C_delayed scenarios, most models sug-
gest a lower capacity addition than the historical rea-
lity, see ﬁgure 4. To reduce coal-based power between
2020 and 2030, the annual capacity addition in the
2C_early scenario is expected to be 10–39 GW inmost
models’ results. Only the REMIND model has reﬂec-
ted a higher potential for solar power, which could
reach up to yearly additions of approximately 200 GW
in 2030.
Even from a long-term perspective, solar power
development is still quite restrictive inmostmodels. In
2050, most models project the total capacity of instal-
led solar PV power to be less than 1500 GW in both 2C
scenarios, which is even lower than theWEO expected
values (IEA 2018) for 2040 in the sustainable develop-
ment scenario.
Figure 4.Upper panel shows the annual capacity additions of nuclear power; lines are from themodels’ results, black dots are
historical data fromChina Electricity Council. Lower panel shows the annual capacity additions of solar PVpower; lines are from the
models’ results, black dots are historical data fromChina Electricity Council. Left panels are for the 2C_delayed scenario and the right
panels are for the 2C_early scenario.
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The current growth of wind and solar power may
be able to compensate for the annual coal power
reduction in the 2C_early scenario. In 2018, combined
wind and solar power generation was 123 TWh higher
than that in 2017. Thus, the current addition levels are
roughly enough to compensate for the annual coal
power reduction that would be required for cost-opti-
mal trajectories to stay within a 2 °C compatible bud-
get. With a continuous increase in installation
numbers, it could potentially compensate for most of
the yearly demand additions of 120–300 TWh yr−1.
4.Discussions and conclusions
China’s currentNDCgoals will not lead to a signiﬁcant
reduction in coal power. A drastic reduction is
required post-2030 to break the coal lock-in. From
2030 to 2050, 187–261 TWh of annual coal power
reduction is required to achieve the 2C_delayed
scenario. As numerous coal-based power plants will
still be within their technical lifetime, they would face
great stranded risks. Certainly, completely retiring
these plants is an extreme approach. A more realistic
way is to operate them at lower load hours. It is still
worth noting that even this ‘partial stranded’ risk
could result in signiﬁcant economic losses. One
possible method to reduce the stranded risk is to
introduce CCS technology into coal power plants. As
Fan pointed out in a previous study (Fan et al 2018), if
CCS commercialization can be achieved in 2030, the
CCS retroﬁtting potential would reach 460 GW.
To avoid additional coal lock-in, the cost-effective
scenario 2C_early suggests immediate stoppage of fur-
ther investment in coal power. If China stops building
new coal power plants from 2020, it is possible to
lower the annual coal power reduction to 104–155
TWh, which could effectively reduce the scale of coal
power plants with stranded risk.
The carbon price in all the models increases
rapidly as we introduce the WB2C target, which is the
direct reason for stranding coal plants.Moreover, even
without the high carbon price, coal power is still losing
its cost advantage in China. According to the National
Energy Conservation Center (NDRC), with signiﬁcant
reduction in construction costs, solar PV and onshore
wind power have already become cost-competitive
with coal power in certain areas that are rich in resour-
ces (National Energy Conservation Center 2019).
Meanwhile, China ismaking a great effort in exploring
the reasonable carbon pricing method, which can fur-
ther reduce the cost advantage of coal power.
Early coal control could prevent more plants from
being stranded. However, more ambitious plans on
the promotion of alternatives is required in the mean-
time, bringing additional cost to the energy system
between 2020 and 2030. Among all the alternatives,
nuclear, wind and solar are expected to be the most
important between 2020 and 2030.
There is great uncertainty around nuclear power
development. Therefore, we should be more careful
about its planning, especially in the short term. From
the models’ results, the installed capacity of nuclear
power ranges from 120–210 GW in 2030, which
requires a signiﬁcant speed-up on current promotion.
Given the rapid development in recent years, the
promotion of wind and solar power may be able to
compensate for the annual coal power reduction in the
2C_early scenario and even cover most of the increase
in demand. In 2018, the increase in power generation
from solar and wind power reached 120 TWh. How-
ever, it is worth noting that solar powermay be under-
estimated in most models, since they present a lower
capacity addition than the current situation in
2-degree scenarios.
A power system roadmap should consider the
trade-off between all the power sources. With coal
power being gradually phased out, the industry and its
related employment will suffer (Spencer et al 2018);
although, job losses in mining might occur even with
stable demand due to productivity increase
(IEA 2017). On the other hand, the coal phase-out
could provide more opportunities in the renewable
sector. In the case of the solar PV industry, China has
built a complete industry chain for solar PV power
with years of effort, which provided around 2.2 mil-
lion jobs in 2017 (IRENA 2018). This industry sup-
ported the rapid deployment of solar PV power, but its
future also depends on the sustainable promotion of
PV in the coming decades.
In summary, these ﬁndings highlight two policy
implications. The ﬁrst one is that coal phase-out is
necessary in pursuing the WB2C target in China and
early action on coal power control can help avoid
additional coal lock-in in the next decade. To realize
smooth coal phase-out, a carbon pricing scheme with
increasing prices could be considered. Besides, to
reduce the potential economic losses of stranding coal
plants, the power industry should take the develop-
ment of CCS technology seriously. Second, the pro-
motion of low-carbon alternatives should be
accelerated when phasing out coal-based power, indi-
cating the policy package should contain both control
measures for coal power and promotion measures for
alternatives. Given the rapid changes in the solar and
wind power industry, future planning should make
sure that the latest developments and near-term tech-
nology outlook are not only taken into consideration
in IAMs or other evaluation tools, but in policy
making.
This research has certain limitations, which could
be tackled in future studies. First, we estimated the
scale of stranded assets under 2C scenarios. However,
the resulting economic losses were not evaluated. The
monetization of stranded risk might provide more
intuitive information, but would require more gran-
ular data. Second, as we already know the scale of
stranded assets and also their age distribution, ways to
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reduce their economic losses is also necessary, for
example retroﬁtting with CCS technology or use as
backup capacity might be helpful. Third, for the pro-
motion of alternatives, sensitive analysis considering
the uncertainty in technical progress can be useful for
the roadmap design, especially for technologies with
rapid development, such as solar PV power. Fourth,
wementioned that renewables might play a signiﬁcant
role in closing the electricity supply gap, but as we did
not explore the potential challenge on the load man-
agement, further study on detailed renewable plan-
ningwould also be valuable.
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